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CAMBODIA'S WTO ACCESSION: A STRENUOUS BUT
NECESSARY STEP FOR A POOR NATION SEEKING
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
Rebecca Povarchukt
Abstract: During the 2003 World Trade Organization ("WTO") Ministerial
Conference, Cambodia became the first least-developed nation to accede to the WTO
through the organization's full working party accession process. Due to domestic,
political, and economic pressures to accede, Cambodia agreed to an arduous package of
legal and economic reform that have left many, including Cambodian officials,
wondering whether the small country is capable of meeting its obligations. Having
plunged into the WTO with the belief that accession is its best hope for a prosperous
future, Cambodia now faces the challenges of implementation.
In arguing against WTO membership for Cambodia, critics condemn powerful
developed nations like the United States for pressuring the smaller, poorer country into an
inequitable arrangement that may leave poor farmers worse off and the sick without
access to drugs. Yet liberalizing its markets and integrating its economy with the rest of
the world will ultimately benefit Cambodia because it will stimulate reform, encourage
the continued flow of international assistance, and provide trade protections it otherwise
would not enjoy. As a trade-dependent country, Cambodia made a wise investment by
successfully negotiating for WTO membership. WTO membership can be a helpful tool
for achieving greater prosperity for developing nations like Cambodia because it
encourages progressive domestic policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2003, during the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
Fifth Ministerial Conference, Cambodia became the first least-developed
country ("LDC")1 to accede to the organization through its full working
party process.2  Thirty other LDCs3 have been WTO members since the
t The author is most grateful to many. Professor Jane Winn of the University of Washington School
of Law provided valuable guidance, and Professor Andr6 Sapir of the Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles offered
enlightening instruction. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal editors, especially Samuel Rodabough, were
commendably meticulous in their duties and the author owes them many thanks. Valentin Povarchuk's
nurturing, support, and understanding were indispensable, as was Samara Povarchuk's exuberance.
The United Nations has designated 49 countries as LDCs based on economic criteria such as low
income and economic vulnerability. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
2002 REPORT at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2002, U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.D.13 (2002) [hereinafter
UNCTAD].
2 WTO, Canctin Ministerial Statement, para. 2, WTO Doc. WTO/MIN(03)/20, (Sep. 23, 2003).
3 WTO, Understanding the WTO: the Organization, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/org7 e.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2004) (list of LDC
WTO members).
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trade organization formed in 1995 as an extension of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").4
As a young democracy and fledgling market economy, Cambodia's
government has pursued policies designed to strengthen the rule of law,
establish political checks and balances, and foster a thriving civil society.
5
The cornerstone of the government's long-term economic objectives has
been to increase trade and support economic growth via regional and global
integration.6  Accordingly, Cambodia has actively pursued WTO
membership.7
Membership, however, has not come without sacrifice. Even pro-
WTO Cambodian officials have expressed concern over their country's
future and whether they will be able to implement their membership
obligations.8 The WTO called implementation of the obligations "a lengthy
and difficult process." 9  International humanitarian organizations have
condemned WTO's accession as dangerous for the poor and the sick,' 0 and
criticized the WTO for taking advantage of Cambodia."
This Comment argues that, despite the country's onerous accession
commitments, WTO membership will benefit Cambodia by furthering its
goal of achieving increased economic prosperity through trade. Part II of
this Comment outlines Cambodia's recent political, social, and economic
history and the resulting challenges that this history presents to the WTO
requirement of economic liberalization. Part III explores some of the
specific disadvantages that LDCs like Cambodia face during WTO accession
negotiations and membership. Part IV examines some of Cambodia's
specific WTO accession commitments that have drawn criticism from
4 See, Symposium, The United Nations Family: Challenges of Law & Development: the World
Trade Organization: a New Stage in International Trade & Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 329 (1995).
5 See Senior Minister Sok An, Address at the Workshop on Doctrine of Precedents, Separation of
Power, Cheeks and Balances (June 10, 2002), at
http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government/govermnentl22.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
6 Pich Rithi, Impact of Economic and Trade Liberalization on Cambodia, Address to the
Globalization Conference: Business and Law Perspectives (June 27, 2001), at
http://www.moc.gov.kh/econointergration/impage economic-trade.htm.
7 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, para. 6, WTO Doc.
WT/ACC/KHM/21 (Aug. 15, 2003).
s ECON. & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PAC., FACILITATING THE ACCESSION OF ESCAP
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO WTO THROUGH REGIONAL COOPERATION at 97, U.N. Doe. ST/ESCAP/2215,
U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.F.66 (2002).
WTO, supra note 7, para. 7.
'0 See OXFAM INT'L, CAMBODIA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO: HOW THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE IS
APPLIED TO ONE OF THE WORLD'S POOREST COUNTRIES (2003).
" MtDECINS SANS FRONTIRES, DOHA DERAILED: A PROGRESS REPORT ON TRIPS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 2 (2003), available at http://www.msf.org/source/access/2003/derailed/report.pdf (last visited
May 1, 2004).
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human rights advocates, then highlights the benefits of WTO membership.
Finally, Part V argues that Cambodia can greatly benefit from WTO
membership by implementing reformatory and progressive domestic
policies.
II. CAMBODIA SINCE 1975: FROM KHMER ROUGE TO WTO
In the last thirty years, the Cambodian people have experienced brutal
totalitarianism, devastating civil war, foreign invasion, and most recently,
democratization. 2  Cambodia still suffers from the legacy of political
extremism that characterized the nation during the 1970s and 1980s.
13
During the 1990s, the small country emerged from isolation and began an
attempt to secure its place as a democratic Asian exporter through yet
another major political and economic shift.14  Cambodia has engaged in
major reforms in order to become more WTO-compatible.15 It encountered
serious political, judicial, and economic challenges to implementing
democratic ideals and achieving the level of liberalization necessary to
integrate globally.
16
A. Pol Pot's Cambodia and the Subsequent Vietnamese Regime: Death,
Poverty, and Destruction
In 1975, the Khmer Rouge gained control of Cambodia 17 and set upon
the destruction of much of the country's financial, governmental, legal, and
social structures. 18 The regime banished money, blew up the central bank
and many court houses, destroyed government documents, dismantled the
education system, and massacred millions. 19 Under its infamous leader Pol
Pot, the Khmer Rouge attempted to wipe out all social classes. 20 In one of
the most horrific state-committed atrocities of the twentieth century, 21 up to
12 Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J.INT'L.L. 1 (1993).
13 WTO, supra note 7, para. 4.
14 See WTO, Accession of Cambodia: Memorandum of the Foreign Trade Regime, at 2, WTO Doc.
WT/ACC/KHMI21 (June 22, 1999).
:5 WTO, supra note 7, para. 6.
6 See id. para. 4.
I7 Ratner, supra note 12, at 3.
8 See BASIL FERNANDO, PROBLEMS FACING THE CAMBODIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 55 (1998).
19 WTO, supra note 14, at 1.
20 FERNANDO, supra note 18, at 44.
21 Ratner, supra note 12, at 3.
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two million people died in a period of only a few years.22  This short
experiment in social reconstruction devastated Cambodia.23
The Vietnamese invaded and gained control of Cambodia in 1978,24
and established a regime that defined itself by its opposition to American
hegemony and the capitalist system.25 During the next twenty years of
Vietnamese rule, civil war26 ensued until the United Nations ("U.N.")
27intervened in 1992 to implement an accord between the fighting factions.
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC")
assumed control of the country in a successful intervention to establish
28peace. In 1993, UNTAC oversaw democratic elections in which
approximately ninety percent of registered voters participated.29
In light of its turbulent recent history, 30 the current Cambodian
government is eager to achieve stability and economic prosperity.
31
Increasing international economic integration, especially through WTO
membership, is the path the government has chosen in order to attain these
goals.32 Government policy has adopted trade as a strategy to reduce
entrenched poverty. 33  Given the recent decades of instability and
destruction, however, the Cambodian government is now faced with a long
list of domestic problems.
22 WTO, supra note 14, at 1.
23 Patricia Gossman, et al., Asia Watch Update, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 285, 291 (1993).
24 Vietnam invaded Cambodia because of historical tensions, and in part because of cross-border
raids by some Cambodians. Ratner, supra note 12, at 3.
CAMBODIA CONST. pmbl. (People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989); Deputy Sec'y of the
Communist Party of Kampuchea Nuon Chea, Statement to the Communist Workers' Party of Denmark
(July 1978) (on file with author).
26 Armed conflict ensued between Khmer Rouge forces who escaped to the jungles and fought as
guerrillas, and the Vietnamese puppet regime. Mann (Mac) Bunyanunda, Note: The Khmer Rouge On
Trial. Whither The Defense?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2001).
2 S.C. Res. 745, U.N. SCOR, 3057th mtg, U.N. Doe. S/RES/745 (1992).
2S See Ademola Abass, War and Armed Conflict, in OXFORD UNIV. PRESS CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
7(137) (2002) (book review).
29 Nhan T. Vu, The Holding Of Free And Fair Elections In Cambodia: The Achievement Of The
United Nations 'Impossible Mission, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177, 1201 (1995).
3' The U.N. and Cambodia have been in discussions about the establishment of a Tribunal since
1997, but so far U.N. concerns about the impartiality and independence of the tribunal have delayed its
realization. Daniel Kemper Donovan, Joint U.N.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal,
44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 551 (2003).
31 Prime Minister Hun Sen, My Vision for Cambodia, Address at the Cambodia Investment and
Trade 2002 Conference (May 15, 2002), at http://www.us-asean.org/Cambodia/CAM02_Report Final.doc
(last visited May 1, 2004).
32 Id.
33 See CAMBODIA MINISTRY OF PLANNING, POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER PREPARATION
STATUS REPORT TO THE IMF 3 (2001).
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B. Years of Social and Economic Adversity Leave Cambodia in Need of
Major Reforms
The impact of nearly two decades of radical regimes has complicated
Cambodia's reform process. 34 In particular, this process has highlighted the
need to stabilize political processes and legal institutions. Long-lasting
political divides have sparked erratic violence and concerns about more
conflict. 35  In addition to countless individual traumas resulting from the
mass murders under the Khmer Rouge, the mass slaughter of the country's
intellectuals created a tremendous knowledge gap that has plagued its
government institutions, especially the judiciary. 36  WTO membership
negotiations have brought international attention to many of these problems
because of the volume of assistance needed to address them.37 Moreover,
the accession process has assisted in securing this vital international
cooperation and assistance.
38
1. Cambodia's Recent Political Volatility has Threatened Reform
Despite a largely successful power sharing agreement between
Cambodia's two main political parties, the country has experienced bursts
of political killings and violence.4 ° In January 2003, riots led to the
destruction of the Thai embassy, 41 drawing U.N. concern.42  Foreign
governments43 and human rights organizations have accused the Cambodian
34 WTO, supra note 14, at 1.
35 See Miranda Leitsinger, New Generation Has a Different Set of Concerns, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 6,
2004, at A3.
36 See FERNANDO, supra note 18; DOLORES A. DONOVAN & JEFFREY S. BRAND, COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF EAST ASIA 64-5 (Alan Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997).
" See infra Part IV.D.
31 See infra Part IV.C, IV.D.
39 These parties are the CPP (Cambodian People's Party) and FUNCINPEC (French acronym for the
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia).
40 In 1997, forces loyal to each of the co-Prime Ministers fought; the situation stabilized with a 1998
power sharing agreement. In 2000, independent fighters attacked public buildings, and several political
candidates and activists were assassinated. U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA, COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE
2002 CAMBODIA 27 (2002), available at http://usembassy.state.gov/cambodia/wwwfOOOl.pdf (last visited
May 1, 2004).
41 Press Release, Spokesman Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep't of State, Street Violence in Cambodia
(Jan. 30, 2003).42 G.A. Res. 57/225, U.N.GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/57/225 (2003).
43 The U.S. maintains that the military and police engage in domestic political killings. U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18238.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
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government of human rights violations including torture,
44 unfair trials, 45
and limitations on free speech.46 A 2003 U.N. resolution noted that torture,
illegal child labor, and inhumane prison conditions have persisted.47
Political corruption at the highest levels of Cambodia's government
has been another target of international criticism. Concerns over Prime
Minister Hun Sen's rise to power48 prompted the United States to suspend
foreign aid to the Cambodian government.49  Moreover, although the 2003
elections were an improvement over the violent 1998 elections,5 ° they still
fell short of international standards.51
2. Cambodia's Judicial and Executive Branches: The Lack of Lawyers,
Corruption, and Structural Problems
One of the most fundamental problems facing Cambodia today is the
paucity of trained lawyers and judges.52 Under the Khmer Rouge, law books
were destroyed and judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and legislators were
slaughtered.53 The Vietnamese subsequently installed a socialist judiciary
that conducted farcical trials.54 After the U.N. intervention, the Cambodian
bar formed with only thirty-eight members.55 Consequently, a lack of
attorneys has remained a major problem; there are too few in general, and
4 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA A HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW BASED ON THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, Al Doc. No. ASA 23/007/2003 (2003), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa
2 3 00 7 2 0 0 3 (last visited May 1, 2004).
45 Press Release, Anesty International, Cambodia: Fair Trial and Due Process Are Not Up for
Negotiation, (Apr. 25, 2003), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA230062003?open&of=ENG-KHM (last visited May 1,
2004).
46 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Freedom of Speech Under Attack (Feb. 11,
2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/02/cambodia0 2 llO3.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
4' G.A. Res. 57/225, supra note 42, at 3-4.
48 Hun Sen staged a successful coup to gain power before the 1998 elections. William W. Burke-
White, A Community of Courts: Toward A System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1, 31 (2002). Further, there are allegations that he uses his position to skim $400 million a year
from various transactions. Christopher Gunness, Analysis: Cambodia's 'Missing' PM, BBC, July 25, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/30
9 7 3 9 3
.stm (last visited May 1, 2004).
49 CON. RESEARCH SERV., CAMBODIA: BACKGROUND & U.S. RELATIONS 5 (2002).
50 Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming Cambodian History: The Case for a Truth Commission, 24 FLETCHER F.
WORLDAFF. 137, 148 (2000).
"' See id.
52 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia,
U.N. Econ. and Social Council Commn'n on Human Rights, 58th Sess., at 12-14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2002/118 (2002) [hereinafter Report of Secretary General].
53 DONOVAN & BRAND, supra note 36, at 84.
54 FERNANDO, supra note 18, at 54.
55 DONOVAN & BRAND supra note 36, at 114.
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they are concentrated in the capital, away from most of the population. 6
The Cambodian government has recognized the gravity of the problem but
notes that the training of lawyers is a long-term goal.57 In response,
international assistance has been targeted at developing legal curricula and
Cambodian legal materials, providing legal education to Cambodians
abroad, and creating and managing the bar association.58 As new lawyers
have entered practice, however, they have joined a profession known in
Cambodia for corruption.
59
Widespread judicial corruption has also been a problem for
Cambodians and foreigners in Cambodia. It is the most significant deterrent
to both Cambodian and foreign investors60 and it has thwarted attempts to
reduce poverty. 61 Adequate provisions against corruption and bribery
simply do not exist.62 Cambodia is not party to any international anti-
corruption agreements, nor has national legislation been enacted.63
Moreover, inadequate salaries 64 leave judges unable to support their
families' minimum needs, making them susceptible to corruption.65  The
U.N. has called on Cambodia to increase its judiciary budget for this
reason.66 In addition to budgetary concerns, the judiciary has suffered from
excessive dependence on the executive branch.67
Although the Cambodian Constitution explicitly withholds judicial
powers from the executive and legislative branches, 8 in reality the judiciary
has struggled for independence.69 Constitutionally, the power ofjudicial and
prosecutorial appointments lies with an "independent" body-the Supreme
56 The U.N. estimates that there is now only one lawyer for every 50,000 Cambodians, most of those
in the capital. Report of Secretary General, supra note 52, at 13.
57 Sec'y of State for Commerce Sok Siphana, Legal and Judicial Reform Strategy for Cambodia,
Address to the Steering Committee for Legal and Judicial Reform ch. 4 (Mar. 22, 2001), at
http://www.moc.gov.kh/laws regulation/legalreform strategy-fnaldraft.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
58 For an example of an aid program, see Center for Law and Global Justice, Univ. of SF School of
Law, http://www.usfca.edu/law/globaljustice/cambodia.html (last visited May 1, 2004).
5' Monroe E. Price, Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives the
Experience of Intergovernmental & Non-Governmental Organizations, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1, 20 (2000).
6' U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA, supra note 40, at 27-28.
61 ASIAN DEV. BANK, ECONOMIC TRENDS AND PROSPECTS IN DEVELOPING ASIA 66-7 (2003).
'2 U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA, supra note 40, at 27-28.
63 The legislature rejected a national anti-corruption proposal in 1999. Id. at 28.
64 Only .3% of the 2000 national budget was allocated to the Ministry of Justice ("MOJ"), which
included the judiciary's budget and salaries.
65 U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA, supra note 40, at 27.
66 G.A. Res. 57/225, supra note 42, at 2.
67 See Siphana, supra note 57.
69 CAMBODIA CONST., arts. 109-ill.
69 Siphana, supra note 57.
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Council of the Magistry ("SCM"). 70  Pursuant to subsequent legislation,
however, the SCM is governed by rules set by the Ministry of Justice
("MOJ")-an executive branch ministry-thus compromising the SCM's
constitutional mandate. 71 The SCM is also responsible for judicial oversight
by investigating and punishing corruption, which it has failed to do.72
Moreover, the executive branch itself recognizes that its highest court is
excessively political and dependent on the executive.73  Indeed, judges
without adequate legal training regularly seek "opinions, suggestions, or
legal interpretation regarding cases" from the MOJ. 74 The U.N. has urged
reform to eliminate the "corruption and interference of the executive with
the independence of the judiciary., 75 Thus, while Cambodia faces problems
with its judiciary functioning within the framework of existing laws and
mandates, other problems have arisen where no laws exist at all.
3. Cambodia is Attempting to Respond to the WTO's Concerns
Regarding the Lack of Cambodian Laws and Law Enforcement
The complete absence of laws in many areas of Cambodian society
has presented a dilemma for Cambodians and foreign investors alike.76
WTO Director-General Mike Moore noted during a 2003 visit that the
country would have to pass forty new laws in order to be ready to join the
WTO.77 The Cambodian Commerce Secretary has emphasized that laws are
drafted and presented to the Senate and National Assembly on a regular
basis.78 Indeed, several key laws have been passed, including laws on
insurance, banking, and taxation.79 Other areas of concern have remained
unaddressed, such as commercial dispute resolution.
80
In addition to the lack of fundamental laws, enforcement of existing
laws has been inconsistent or even completely absent. For example,
71 CAMBODIA CONST., art. 115.
71 See Siphana, supra note 57.
72 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 52, at 13.
73 See Siphana, supra note 57.
74 Id.
7' G.A. Res. 57/225, supra note 42, at 2.
76 The primary challenge for those doing business in Cambodia despite its corruption problems and
difficulty in finding competent legal counsel is determining whether applicable laws exist, and if so, what
they are. DONOVAN & BRAND, supra note 36, at 117-18.
77 Cambodia Strives for Tougher Intellectual Property Rights, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec.
28, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Deutsche Presse-Agentur File.
78 id.
79 Insurance Law (2000) (Cambodia); Banking and Financial Institutions Law (1999) (Cambodia);
Taxation Law (1997) (Cambodia).
80 WTO, supra note 7, para. 33-4.
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notwithstanding a 2002 law on copyrights,8 1 the market for illegal pirated
goods has flourished and the products have remained readily available.
8 2
The Director of the Culture Ministry announced that crackdowns to enforce
the new law would ensue until all illegal materials were seized or taken off
the market.8 3 Remarkably, however, vendors say they were tipped off before
a raid. 4  Nevertheless, enacting the law was a step toward international
norms initiated by WTO accession, and continued enforcement efforts
should follow. Reliable law enforcement is essential to Cambodia's
emerging economy.
C. Trade is an Indispensable Tool for Elevating Cambodia's Prosperity
Although Cambodia remains one of the world's poorest nations,85 its
government has made significant progress in developing its economy since
the early 1990s. 8 6 The first piece of legislation passed by the new legislature
was a liberal foreign investment law,s7 providing generous incentives such
as temporary tax exemptions, a low corporate tax rate of 9%, and duty-
exempt imports for certain products.88  During the 1990s, Cambodia was
more successful in attracting foreign direct investment than most other
LDCs.89 Accordingly, the value of exports increased from US$ 86 million
in 1990 to US$ 1.56 billion in 2001. 90 Despite the Asian financial crisis,91
the gross domestic product ("GDP") of Cambodia grew by 4.8% between
1990 and 1999.92
a' Law on Copyrights and Related Rights (2002) (Cambodia).
82 WTO Bid Prompts Cambodian Crackdown on VCD Pirates, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, June 16, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Agence Fr.-Presse File.
83 id.
84 id.
15 U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA, supra note 40, at 3.
86 Id. at 21.
87 WILL MARTIN, WORLD BANK, TRADE POLICY REFORM IN THE EAST ASIAN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES 29 (2001).
88 Law on the Investment of the Kingdom of Cambodia, art. 14 (1994) (Cambodia).
89 UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 11.
90 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., UNCTAD HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS at 6, U.N. Doc.
TD/STAT/27, U.N. Sales No. E/F.03.II.D2 (2002).
91 In the late 1990s, the East Asian financial and currency markets experienced volatility leading to
severe economic downturn. Duncan E. Williams, Note: Policy Perspectives On the Use of Capital
Controls In Emerging Market Nations: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis & a Look at the
International Legal Regime, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 564-6 (2001).
92 MARTIN, supra note 87, at 8.
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Although Cambodia remains primarily a rural, agricultural-dependent
nation,93 the rapid expansion of the garment industry has promoted most of
the recent economic growth.94 In 1994, garment exports were US$ 4 million
but by 1999, 89% of exports were garments and generated US$ 640 million
a year.95  Despite difficult factory working conditions, the rise of this
industry is an economic opportunity to help citizens escape rural poverty.
96
Cambodia needs continued brisk job creation in order to supply its
growing labor force with employment. At its current rate of growth, the
nation's population will double within twenty-five years.97 Compared to the
rest of Southeast Asia, its population is disproportionately young and the
birth rate is high.98 The Cambodian government estimates that 150,000 jobs
must be created each year in order to employ those who enter the labor
market.99 Cambodia has turned to regional economic integration (the policy
of active participation in the regional trade networks) as part of its strategy
to promote economic growth.
Regional economic integration has facilitated modernization of
Cambodian trade procedures l° ° and has served as a stepping stone for WTO
membership. 01 Cambodia acceded to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations 1 2  ("ASEAN") in 1999, more than thirty years after the
organization's conception.'0 3  Cambodia has adhered to ASEAN's
declarations, treaties, and agreements,1° 4 including the requirement to lower
93 Agriculture accounts for approximately 70% of the Cambodian work force. ASIAN DEV. BANK,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR FORMULATING A MASTER PLAN FOR
NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 1, ADB Doc. CAM 37252 (2003).
94 In the early 1990s there were only seven garment factories, compared to over 200 ten years later.
U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS: CAMBODIA 3 (2000), available at
http://usembassy.state.gov/cambodia/wwwf0002.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004).
95 Id.
96 See John A. Hall, Human Rights & the Garment Industry in Contemporary Cambodia, 36 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 119, 173 (2000).
97 WORLD BANK, AGRICULTURE PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT 1, World Bank Report No.
15984-KH (1997).
9s Forty percent of Cambodians are 14 years or younger, and the median age is 19.2, compared to
Vietnam and Thailand which have median ages of 24.5 and 30.1, respectively. CIA, WORLD FACT BOOK
(2003).
Minister of Com. Cham Prasidh, Presentation to Cambodia Consultative Group Meeting,
Mainstreaming Trade Strategy for Poverty Alleviation in Cambodia (June 12, 2001), available at
http://www.moc.gov.kh/propoor/presentation_5_files/frame.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
1oo UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 127.
'01 See WTO, supra note 14, at 94.
12 One of the most successful aspects of ASEAN has been its focus on economic matters, though
cooperation also occurs in political, security, and functional matters. ASIAN DEv. BANK, TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA & LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO PREPARE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN
ASEAN 1, ADB Doc. OTH 30147 (Dec. 1996).
:03 See Bangkok Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, ASEAN, 6 I.L.M. 1233.
04 WTO, supra note 14, at 94.
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tariffs.105  Joining was also important in the WTO context because it
signaled the government's commitment to the liberalization of the
Cambodian economy.106
Beyond Asia, Cambodia has concluded bilateral trade agreements.0 7
In order to protect its textile exports to the United States-its most important
export market-the two nations concluded a unique 1999 agreement in
which Cambodia accepted the monitoring of its labor practices in exchange
for a quota on export goods to the United States.'0 8 The U.N. International
Labor Organization assisted in the agreement's implementation by
monitoring Cambodia's obligations under the agreement. 09 Under the
agreement, the United States rewards Cambodia for improvements in labor
conditions by raising the quota."0 Indeed, in 2004, the United States
increased the quota due to improved labor practices."'
Thus, trade has served as the most important element leading to
Cambodia's economic growth. This reflects the decision on the part of the
Cambodian government to use trade to address the legacy of economic and
social problems left behind by former regimes. In fewer than thirty years,
Cambodia has transformed from a suffering nation isolated by its brutal
leaders to a modernizing democracy attempting to attract foreign investment.
While Cambodia has remained extremely poor and experienced systemic
problems such as political instability and judicial corruption, its overall
welfare has improved. Cambodian leaders have turned to trade, and
consequently WTO membership, as a sustainable method for economic
growth.
'0' See Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Flexible Free Trade: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 34
HARV. INT'L L.J. 224, 227 (1993); Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the
ASEAN Free Trade Area, Jan. 28, 1992, art. IV, ASEAN, 31 I.L.M. 513.
106 DONOVAN &BRAND, supra note 36, at 88-9.
"57 Cambodia has bilateral agreements with, among others, Korea, Switzerland and Thailand. WTO,
supra note 14, at 93.
... Theodore R. Posner & Timothy M. Reif, Homage to a Bull Moose: Applying the Lessons of
History to Meet the Challenges of Globalization, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 481, 510-11 (2000).
..9 See INT'L LABOR ORG., FIRST SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING CONDITIONS SITUATION IN
CAMBODIA'S GARMENT SECTOR (Nov. 2001).
10 See Directive to the Commissioner of Customs, Adjustment of Import Limits for Certain Cotton,
Wool & Man-Made Fiber Textile Products Produced or Manufactured in Cambodia, 65 Fed. Reg. 30571
(May 12, 2000).
il The increase could have been higher under the agreement if more progress had been made. Press
Release, Kingdom of Cambodia, USA Ups 2004 Import Quota to 14% (Dec. 5, 2003) (on file with author).
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III. CAMBODIA'S WTO NEGOTIATIONS DEMONSTRATE THAT POOR
NATIONS REMAIN DISADVANTAGED IN ACCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP
Because there is no standard WTO accession protocol, 12 nations seek
membership on terms they negotiate with the WTO based on their
bargaining position.1 3 Given that WTO accession protocols have become
more and more cumbersome compared to the obligations of the original
WTO members," 14 negotiating membership is now an especially burdensome
process for LDCs." 15 The WTO has attempted to address this problem.
The 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Qatar ended with the Doha
Development Declaration,' 6 in which WTO members expressed their
commitment to support developing nations like Cambodia.' 1 7 Despite WTO
efforts to provide LDCs with preferential accession terms, Cambodia was
unable to avail itself successfully of these potential benefits in its accession
negotiations.' 8 Further, the experiences of other developing and LDC WTO
members demonstrate that even as a member, Cambodia will continue to be
marginalized because it is an LDC.11 9
A. The Doha Development Agenda Seeks to Facilitate LDC Accession
The special challenges that developing countries like Cambodia face
during accession and membership have influenced the WTO since its
formation. In fact, the WTO Agreement preamble states concerns about
these nations achieving their share of growth and trade. 120  Similarly,
problems arising out of LDC marginalization surfaced at the first WTO
Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996121 and have resurfaced at
each subsequent conference, as reflected by the ministerial declarations. 22
112 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, art. XII, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1150 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
"3 ECON. & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, supra note 8, at 64.
14 See id. at 68.
15 See UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 230.
116 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 20, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 [hereinafter
Doha Declaration].
"1 See id. paras. 3,42-3.
.. See infra Part IV.A.
.. For discussion on the role of developing nation WTO members in general, see ECON. & SOCIAL
COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, supra note 8, at 35, 57.
120 WTO Agreement, supra note 112, pmbl.
121 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, para. 5, Dec. 13, 1996, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC.
122 See Geneva Ministerial Declaration, para. 5, 6, May 20, 1998, WTO Doc. WTV/MIN(98)/DEC/l;
Press Release, WTO, Seattle Conference Doomed to Succeed Says Moore (Nov. 30, 1999) WTO. Doc. No.
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The 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference sought to remedy the concerns
expressed by LDCs. The Ministerial Declaration 123 ("Doha Declaration")
referenced the Zanzibar Declaration24 -prepared by LDC trade ministers in
advance of the overall WTO conference in order to adopt a common
position-and recognized "the seriousness of the concerns expressed by" the
LDCs.125 Issues highlighted in the Zanzibar Declaration include the need for
realistic WTO demands and flexibility in the timeframe during which LDCs
are expected to implement reforms.
126
Sufficient consensus at the conference existed for the Doha
Declaration to recognize that the policy for LDC accession needed updating
to better reflect the realities those nations face. 12 7 The Doha Declaration
broadly stated that more work "to facilitate and accelerate negotiations" was
needed, and that it remained a priority for current members. 12 Additionally,
the declaration also contained relatively concrete actions to be taken in order
to achieve this end. First, the ministers agreed that the WTO Secretariat
should take LDC accession into account in formulating the annual technical
assistance plans. 129 Second, the ministers directed the WTO Sub-Committee
for Least-Developed Countries to design a work program for LDCs.
1 30
Third, they directed the Director-General of the Integrated Framework13 1 to
prepare a report on "all issues affecting" LDCs.1 32 Finally, they directed that
Special and Differential provisions be reviewed "with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational." 33
Press/156; Doha Declaration, supra note 116, para. 42-3; Press Release, WTO, WTO Members Agree On
Ways to Boost LDC Participation in Services Negotiations (Sep. 3, 2003) WTO Doc. Press/35 1.
123 Doha Declaration, supra note 116, para. 42.
124 WTO, Zanzibar Declaration: LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting, Aug. 11, 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/L/409 [hereinafter Zanzibar Declaration].
125 Doha Declaration, supra note 116, para. 42.
126 Zanzibar Declaration, supra note 124, at 2.
127 Doha Declaration, supra note 116, para. 42.
121 Id. para. 42.
129 Id.
130 id.
'" See infra Part IV.C.2.
:32 Doha Declaration, supra note 116, para. 43.
'"' Id. para. 44.
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B. Cambodia and Other LDCs Viewed Its WTO Accession as a Test of
the WTO 's Commitment to Fair Treatment Of LDCs
Because each WTO accession package is specific to each acceding
nation,' 34 different nations can effectively achieve better accession terms
than others. This creates disparate classes within the WTO as accession
countries "get not what they deserve but what they negotiate."' 35 The U.N.
observed that "[t]he aspiring member is often influenced to accept terms and
conditions contrary to the spirit of the WTO."'136 It is widely believed that
the LDC accession process is excessively long and the terms too
demanding. 137 Many observers of trade issues now refer to membership
commitments as "WTO-plus"1 38 to indicate that new acceding members
agree to greater commitments than what the original members agreed to
when the WTO originally formed. 139 Viewed in the most positive light,
WTO-plus commitments have ensured deeper economic and political
integration into the WTO trading regime for Cambodia.
Cambodia viewed its accession process as a test of the WTO's oft-
expressed commitment to treating LDCs favorably and fairly. °40 Nine other
LDCs were contemporaneously in the process of accession with
Cambodia. 4 1 As the first LDC to accede, and to do so after the Doha
Conference, leaders of other LDC accession countries such as Vietnam have
carefully observed Cambodia's process for indications of precedent or
impact on their own accessions.142
Cambodia's WTO negotiators were unsuccessful in obtaining
accession terms that they believed to be reflective of their LDC status. The
Cambodian Commerce Minister stated: "We believe that the package of
concessions and commitments that we have to accept certainly goes far
beyond what is commensurate with the level of development of a least
134 There are no set WTO accession terms; the WTO Agreement provides only that a nation join
based on terms "to be agreed between it and the WTO." WTO Agreement, supra note 112, art. XII.
13' ECON. & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, supra note 8, at 64.
136 Id. at 68.
137 WTO, Technical Note on the Accession Process, at 6, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/10/Rev.I (May 28,
2003)3 8 Id.
"9 See infra Part IV.B.
'40 ECON. & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, supra note 8, at 93.
141 They are Bhutan, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Laos, Nepal, Samoa, Sudan, Vanuatu and Yemen.
142 Vietnam, for example, has not acceded as rapidly as Cambodia. This may be due in part to a
strategic decision, but it is also because the government has not adopted necessary reforms quickly enough.
See WTO Will Save Vietnam from Unfair Deals: UNDP Official, ASIA PULSE, Oct. 2, 2003, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Asia Pulse File.
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developed country like Cambodia.' 4 3  This candid statement belies any
notion that the WTO has committed to fairly tailoring LDC accession
packages.
On the other hand, the Doha Declaration failed to define what WTO
members were committing to in agreeing to "facilitate" LDC accession.,
44
Subsequent WTO documents have referenced the Doha Declaration and
attempted to elucidate the meaning of "facilitate."' 145  For example, in
December 2002, the WTO declared that "WTO Members shall exercise
restraint in seeking concessions and commitments... from acceding LDCs,
taking into account the levels of concessions and commitments undertaken
by existing WTO LDCs Members.', 146 The document, however, does not
define how members are to take into account relevant commitments. The
document could have, for example, used the commitments of existing LDC
members to establish the maximum commitment in a given area. Thus,
despite its attempts, the WTO has not set forth a practicable method of
veritably assisting LDCs through accession.
C. Cambodia Joins Other LDC Members as "Second Class WTO
Citizens"
Although developing nations form the majority of member nations in
the consensus-based WTO, 147 maintaining their voice in the organization is a
struggle. Only one-third of LDC members can afford permanent offices in
Geneva-where the WTO is headquartered-and usually those offices are
responsible for both U.N. relations and WTO responsibilities.148 This means
that most LDCs are not represented at the nearly forty meetings per week
that take place in Geneva to negotiate technical trade issues.149 Those LDCs
that have representation in Geneva generally have only one official working
on WTO issues.' 50  In comparison, the United States has over 250
141 Cambodian Minister Issues Sharp Criticism of WTO after Accession Approval, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Sept. 12, 2003 (on file with author).
144 Doha Declaration, supra note 116, para. 42.
'45 See WTO, Accession of Least-Developed Countries, at 1, WTO Doc. WT/L/508 (Jan. 20, 2003).
146 Id. at 2.
14' Eighty percent of WTO members are either developing, or transition economies. TOM BARRY,
FOREIGN POL'Y. IN Focus, WHAT'S THIS ORG.: WTO, PART 11 (2002) (on file with author).
148 World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/devl e.htm (last
visited May 1, 2004).
t4 CATHOLIC AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS DEV., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WAYS FORWARD ON
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF THE WTO (2000), available at http://www.cafod.org.uk/archive/policy/wto-
reform.shtml (last visited May 1, 2004).
150 Id.
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negotiators, and flies in technical experts for complex issues. 51 Further,
when LDCs do try to effectuate change in the WTO mechanism, they
complain that their voice is ignored and not reflected in official positions
and documents.'
1 52
As a new LDC WTO member, Cambodia has joined the ranks of these
disenfranchised members. While Cambodia theoretically should have
benefited from the goals expressed at Doha, Cambodian negotiators were
unable to obtain terms proportionate to their position. Correspondingly, the
Doha Declaration provided a positive but hollow message to LDCs.
IV. DESPITE ITS ONEROUS WTO COMMITMENTS AND THE INFERIOR ROLE
OF LDCs IN THE WTO, CAMBODIA WILL BENEFIT FROM MEMBERSHIP
While there have been valid concerns and criticism about the effects
of Cambodia's WTO commitments on its most vulnerable citizens,' 53 the
overall benefits of WTO membership justify Cambodia's pro-accession
policy. WTO membership is crucial for Cambodia because it gives the
country the right to take advantage of the trade terms embodied in the
existing WTO agreements.' 54 Additionally, the process of accession to the
WTO stimulated important reforms. 15 5 Cambodia has made a great deal of
progress since the early 1990s when the government adopted a pro-WTO
stance and implemented policies aimed at joining the organization.
56
Finally, the steps that Cambodia made toward WTO accession signal the
country's aim to integrate globally, which is important for Cambodia
because it depends on international assistance simply to meet its basic
needs.1 57 In order to address even basic non-WTO issues such as physical
infrastructure improvements, Cambodia is reliant on foreign aid.
151 Id.
"' MARTIN KHOR, INTERGOVERNMENTAL GROUP OF 24, AN ANALYSIS OF THE WTO's FIFTH
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 3 (2003), available at http://www.g24.org/khorgva.pdf (last visited May 1,
2004).
'53 See OXFAM INT'L, supra note 10.
154 Such as GATT.
'55 See infra Part IV.C.
156 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, supra note 7, para. 6.
5 C.R.S., supra note 49, at 4.
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A. International Humanitarian Agencies Denounce Cambodia's
Accession on Behalf of the Poor, but the Costs Are Justified
Many major humanitarian organizations have condemned Cambodia's
WTO accession, claiming that it will have detrimental effects on
Cambodia's poorest citizens. 15 For example, Mrdecins Sans Fronti&res
("MSF")--an international humanitarian organization providing aid in
emergency medical crises and serving as an advocate for at-risk
populations-accused the WTO of violating the spirit of the Doha
Declaration by negotiating with Cambodia in bad faith and extracting an
unduly one-sided accession agreement.'
1 59
MSF's main concern about the cost of WTO membership is that it
may decrease access to medication for HIV/AIDS-infected individuals.
160
Approximately 170,000 HIV-infected people live in Cambodia,'
61
constituting the highest HIV/AIDS rate in Asia.'62 WTO members are
bound by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement 163 ("TRIPs"), which may preclude the legal use of generic
medication to treat HIV/AIDS and other diseases. 64  While the WTO
provided for delayed implementation of TRIPs for LDCs until 2016,165
Cambodia tried unsuccessfully to negotiate for this benefit,' 66 conceding
instead to implement it after 2007.167 Critics argue that in implementing
151 See Marwaan Macan-Markar, The Price of Cambodia's WTO Entry, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003,
(on file with author).
'59 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 11, at 2.
'6' See id.161 Macan-Markar, supra note 158.
162 Tim Brown, Tackling the HIVIAIDS Epidemic in Asia, ASIA-PAC. POPULATION & POL'Y J, Jan.
2004, at 1.
163 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex I C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. TRIPs is one of the trade agreements
negotiated during the Uruguay Round from 1986-1984. It is binding for all WTO members. Under
TRIPS, nations must provide legal protection for intellectual property, such as drugs, through patents.
UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., PHARMACEUTICALS & THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT: QUESTIONS &
ANSWERS 3 (2000).
164 See Naomi A. Bass, Note: Implications of the TRIPs Agreement for Developing Countries:
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws In Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
191,192 (2002).
165 WTO, Gen. Council Decision: Least-Developed Country Members--Obligations Under Article
70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/LJ478 (July 8,
2002).
1 Macan-Markar, supra note 158. In particular, the United States is blamed for pressuring
Cambodia on this issue in support of the powerful American pharmaceutical industry. See Kobsak
Chutikul, Cambodia Enters WTO-If Painfully So, WORLD PAPER, Oct. 2, 2003, available at
http://www.worldpaper.com/2003/oct0l/wto4.html (last visited May 1, 2004).
167 WTO, supra note 7, para. 204.
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TRIPs, Cambodia will limit the poor's access to HIV/AIDS medications
because of the cost increase associated with using brand name drugs.
168
It would have been unconstructive, however, for Cambodia to
abandon its pursuit of WTO membership in an effort to sidestep TRIPs and
protect the availability of less expensive HIV/AIDS medications. First, the
Cambodian government's efforts to stem the rate of new HIV/AIDS
infection have been relatively successful. 69 Second, this issue is an area of
common concern for all LDC WTO members,170 creating an opportunity for
successful cooperation. Finally, the WTO itself has recognized the need to
interpret TRIPs in a manner sensitive to public health,171 which may create
future inroads for resolving this problem.1
2
Another criticism of Cambodia's WTO accession package is the
allegedly negative impact on Cambodia's poor farmers. 173  Oxfam
International, a confederation of twelve organizations fighting global
poverty globally, has emphasized that wealthier WTO members required
Cambodia to open its agricultural market to a level of competition that will
devastate domestic producers. 174  Cambodia has agreed to bind its
agricultural tariffs at zero, 175 whereas the United States and the European
Union have substantial protections in place for their own agricultural
products. 176 This arrangement raises the fear that, because working farmers
are already deeply impoverished and disadvantaged, those who lose their
livelihood due to competition with foreign goods will be even worse off.
177
Although the potential for harm to Cambodia's farmers is distressing,
Cambodia's future does not lie in protecting its agricultural industry.
78
168 See Alan Boyd, The Heavy Price of WTO Membership, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.atimes.comatimes/SoutheastAsia/E13OAeO2.html (last visited May 22, 2004).
169 UNAIDS & WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 19, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/03.39E (2003).
170 Zanzibar Declaration, supra note 124, at 2.
171 WTO, TRIPS and Public Health: the Situation before Canctin,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/health-backgrounde.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
72 Proponents of TRIPs have argued that generic drugs may still be sold in certain countries, keeping
costs low. Bass, supra note 164, at 200. This is a complicated issue facing large developing nations as
well as small LDCs, and worthy of much greater discussion though it is not the topic of this comment.
173 OXFAM INT'L, supra note 10, at 5.
174 Id. at 8.
:75 WTO, supra note 7, para. 164.
176 The United States' average tariff on agricultural products was nearly 10% in 2002, and the
European Union's averaged 16.1% in 2002. Additionally, both governments significantly subsidize their
domestic producers. WTO, Trade Policy Report: United States, at 100, 105-111, WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/S/126 (Dec. 17, 2003); WTO Trade Policy Report: European Union, at 70-73, WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/S/102 (June 26, 2002).
... See OXFAM INT'L, supra note 10, at 5.
"8 Even with agricultural tariffs in place, the contribution of agricultural pursuits to GDP has fallen
significantly. In 1995, agriculture produced 52% of Cambodia's GDP compared to 37% in 2000. U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 90, at 340.
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Cambodian agricultural yields are inefficient and unproductive., 79  Even
today, the industry has not been successful enough to prevent widespread
malnutrition, 180 let alone serve to promote future economic welfare. Instead
of protecting the current system, which has perpetuated poverty,' 8'
Cambodia has successfully sought economic gain through exports and WTO
membership.
1 82
Cambodia's best chance for long-term economic welfare is to follow
the developed nations' successful model of decreasing agrarian output in
favor of industrial production.' 83 Such a model need not signify the end of
Cambodian agriculture because some level of sustainable agricultural
production is essential to address rural poverty.'8 4 It does, however, require
diversifying crops in order to shift from producing solely for domestic
consumption to exporting higher-value crops. 85  Such a system will
generate higher farmer incomes,' 86 and Cambodians can import less-
expensive rice from neighbors who have a comparative advantage in its
production. 87 Therefore, Cambodia's policy of active participation in the
WTO trading system has the potential to improve farmer welfare, while
increasing trade and diversifying the economy.
B. As a Small Developing Nation, Cambodia Will Derive Significant
Benefit from Existing WTO Agreements
Given Cambodia's limited resources and bargaining power,
multilateral negotiations in the WTO are a more efficient investment of time,
finances, and human resources than negotiating bilateral trade agreements
with each partner.' 88  Additionally, WTO multilateral agreements will
179 VINAY CHAND, INT'L TRADE CENTRE, DIVERSIFIED AGRICULTURAL AND AGRO-PROCESSING
SUPPLY CAPACITY CONSULTANCY MISSION DRAFT REPORT 3, (2003), available at
http://www.moc.gov.kh/intergrated-framework/diversifiedAG draftReport.pdf (last visited May 1,
2004) '8 World Food Programme, Cambodia: Overview, at
http://www.wfp.org/country brief/index.asp?region=5 (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
181 Cambodians grow mostly rice-a low-price commodity-and do so with the inefficient use of
labor and land. CHAND, supra note 179, at 3; ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 93, at 1.
2 See supra Part II.C.1 See RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, & SOCIAL JUSTICE 88 (2003).
184 ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 97, at 1.
's CHAND, supra note 179, at 5.
186 See id.
187 Cambodia's neighboring countries with similar ecosystems have higher yield levels and cropping
intensities. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 93, at 1.
'a' See CENTRE FOR ASIA-PACIFIC INITIATIVES, THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND THE EXPANDING
BORDERS OF THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 130 (Mark A. Buchanan ed.,
1996).
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provide Cambodia with better terms than it could otherwise obtain for itself
on a bilateral basis.18 9 The greater range of market access provided by WTO
membership will be crucial to Cambodian economic expansion and
prosperity.
One of the most important benefits WTO status can confer on
Cambodia will be the ability to take advantage of the general GATT 190
principles of most favored nation ("MFN") status and non-discrimination.'
91
The MFN standard' 92 requires, subject to certain exceptions,' 93 that all WTO
members extend to Cambodia the same trade benefits they extend to any
other nation. The non-discrimination rule requires that Cambodian goods be
treated the same as domestic goods when imported to another WTO
member.
94
Additionally, trade disputes within the WTO are handled by a
structured, rule-based mechanism, 195 which has been rather successful since
its creation in 1995.196 The presence of a defined trade-dispute resolution
process is a major benefit for Cambodia' 97 because it enables it to request
the compulsory formation of a dispute panel in the event that it determines
that another member has violated WTO rules.' 98 While the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism is a benefit to all members, smaller members may
especially benefit from it because the formation of expert independent
panelists affords equal footing to the parties involved.' 9  Furthermore,
special provisions exist to discourage WTO members from requesting
'89 See Martin, supra note 87, at 21; ECON. & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, THE
FUTURE WTO AGENDA & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/2047, U.N. Sales No.
E.00.II.F.50 (2000).
190 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
191 WTO, supra note 7, para. 6.
192 GATT provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties." GATT, supra note 190, art. I.
193 Such as Free Trade Areas and Customs Agreements. Id. art. 24.
"' Id. art. III.
195 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
196 Mohammad Nsour, Fundamental Facets of the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: E-
Commerce, Dispute Resolution, & Beyond, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 742, 775 (2004).
197 See ECON. & SOCIAL COMMI'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, THE FUTURE WTO AGENDA &
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 65, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/2047, U.N. Sales No. E.00.1I.F.50 (2000).
198 DSU, supra note 195, art. 4, para. 7.
199 See id. art. 8, para. 2.
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dispute panels against LDCs in order to take into account "the special
situation" of LDCs.
200
C. WTO Accession Stimulated Valuable "Indirect" Benefits in Cambodia
In addition to the benefits that are explicit in WTO agreements,
membership negotiations have also conferred indirect benefits to Cambodia.
Indirect benefits are those that were generated from the accession process,
such as the stimulus for reforms and the flow of technical assistance. These
two issues are interrelated because as much as the government is willing to
institute technical reform, Cambodia often lacks the necessary experience
and know-how to implement reform successfully.2°'
1. WTO-Inspired Legal and Economic Reforms
WTO accession serves as the ultimate progressive stimulus for
Cambodia because it requires deep legal and economic reforms. 2°2  The
WTO addressed this subject in its publication entitled "Guide to the WTO
and Developing Countries," which stated among other things that "WTO
obligations can help reform-minded governments resist protectionist
pressures," and highlighted the "advantages of compliance with liberalizing
principles., 20 3 WTO-related legal developments in Cambodia have entered
into areas previously seen as being solely under domestic control, such as
intellectual property rights and government subsidies.2 °4 Since its accession,
Cambodia's policies in these areas will have to conform to liberal
international standards that encourage investment and economic growth.
While liberal economic reform can lead to vulnerability due to
increased dependence on the international financial and trading regimes, 205 it
can also stimulate needed economic growth.20 6 Even with the setbacks of
the Asian Financial Crisis, 20 7 economic reform in the region 20 ' lifted 200
200 Id. art. 24 para. 1.
201 The Cambodian government has acknowledged international technical assistance as vital to its
efforts to reform and modernize. See Responses from H.E. Sok Siphana, Sec'y of State, Ministry of Com.,
to the Inter-Agency Working Group (Sept. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.moc.gov.kh/intergratedframework/iawgexper.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).202 See VTO, supra note 7.
203 PETER GALLAGHER, WTO, GUIDE To THE WTO & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 14 (2000).
204 See WTO, supra note 7.
205 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS ch. 4 (2003).
206 Id. at 4.
207 For more information on the background and causes of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late
1990s, see STIGLITZ, supra note 205.
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million people out of poverty during the 1990s. 20 9 Although there are valid
concerns about some of the drawbacks of globalization,210 economic experts
and developed nations alike recognize a free and open international trading
regime as an imperfect but unsurpassed way for developing countries to
211tackle poverty.
Since the early 1990s, the Cambodian government has been working
on reforms designed to prepare for its WTO accession. 21 2  For example,
Cambodia designed an independent tribunal to review appeals of
administrative decisions in matters governed by WTO agreements,2 3 as
required by WTO rules.214 Additionally, Cambodia has drafted a law
establishing commercial courts with specially trained judges.215 These
judicial reforms were executed to provide more transparency and
predictability for investors and to fulfill its WTO requirements.21 6 The
improvements of the judicial system were undertaken with the aid of
international technical assistance.217 Hopefully, these reforms will improve
the problems identified as barriers to investment by foreign business
ventures.
218
2. WTO Membership Will Ensure the Flow of Continued Aid
With more than half of the government's budget coming from foreign
aid,2 19 Cambodia cannot afford to alienate donors by shunning reform.
While key donor nations have recognized Cambodia as a compelling case
208 By, 2001, the following East Asian countries were WTO members: Bangladesh, China, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
209 Babette Stem, Le BIT Passe au Cribles les Faillites et les Exc~s de la Mondialisation, LE MONDE,
Feb. 25, 2004, at 2.
25 See, e.g., ILO, A FAIR GLOBALIZATION: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL 7 (2004); STIGLITZ,
supra note 205, at 5-7.
" Interview with Petros Mavroidis, Professor at Columbia University School of Law, in Brussels,
Belgium (Feb. 16, 2004); Joseph F. Stiglitz, Trade and the Developing World: A New Agenda, CURRENT
HISTORY, Nov. 1999, at 388; See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the Third United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, COM 0209 final at 7
(2002."2 WTO, supra note 7, para. 6.
213 Id. para. 36.
214 GATT, supra note 190, art. X.
215 WTO, supra note 7, para. 35.
216 Id.
2 1 Id. para. 35.
2 8 See supra Part II.B.2.
219 C.R.S., supra note 49, at 4.
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for foreign aid,22 ° much of the international aid for Cambodia has been
appropriated specifically to support WTO-preparation activities.
1
The WTO accession process was complex, lengthy, and resource-
222intensive, 2 but Cambodia has received significant financial and technical
support throughout the process.223 Special accommodations for developing
nations have included technical assistance from the WTO Secretariat before,
during, and after accession, 224 and participation in the Integrated Framework
program. 225 Cambodia was one of three nations first selected for assistance
from the Integrated Framework on a pilot basis. 226  Individual nations
serving on the WTO Accession Working Party also provided valuable
227technical assistance.  The country initially received large amounts of
disaster-type humanitarian aid.228  Beyond emergency assistance at this
stage, it must progress forward in order to receive lasting help.
Cambodia needs significant ongoing technical assistance to achieve its
political and economic goals. 229 Although many of these goals relate
23specifically to WTO obligations, Cambodia also needs aid to address non-
WTO related fundamental problems such as poor physical infrastructure, 23'
220 See Hearing on Foreign Assistance Oversight, 108th Cong., ist Sess. (2003) (prepared testimony
of Wendy Chamberlin, Asst. Administrator, Asia & Near East Bureau, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.).
221 See, e.g., ASIAN DEV. BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR CAPACITY BUILDING ON SELECTED
WTO ISSUES, ABD Doc. TRA 37123 (detailing ABD technical assistance on WTO issues); Hearing on
Recent Developments in Southeast Asia, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2004) (prepared testimony of Gordon
West, Deputy Asst. Administrator, Asia & Near East Bureau, U.A. Agency for Int'l Dev.) (giving examples
of U.S. support for WTO-necessary reform); EUROPEAN UNION, THE EC-CAMBODIA COUNTRY STRATEGY
REPORT 2000-2003 54 (2000) (identifying key areas of E.U. support for Cambodia's accession).
222 In the late 1990s, it was estimated that the average cost of implementing Uruguay Round
provisions was US$ 130 million. In comparison, at that time, most LDC governments did not expend that
much yearly on capital expenditures. UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 230.
23 See WTO, supra note 7, paras. 35, 89, 101,205.
224 GALLAGHER, supra note 203, at 123.
225 Doha Declaration, supra note 116, para. 43. The IF is a group of six international agencies- the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development, the U.N. Development Programme, and the International Trade Centre-
collaborating to provide assistance collectively and efficiently. Integrated Framework, Working Together
to Enable LDCs to Be Active Players and Beneficiaries of the Global Trading System: The Integrated
Framework Explained, available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/IF-explained.pdf (last
visited May 1, 2004).
226 ECON. & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, supra note 8, at 39.
227 MINISTRY OF COM. OF CAMBODIA, CAMBODIA'S EXPERIENCES IN THE WTO ACCESSION PROCESS
(2002), available at http://www.moc.gov.kh~econo-intergration/wto/default.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
2s FERNANDO, supra note 18, at 52.
229 See, e.g., WTO, supra note 7, paras. 28, 35, 75, 85, 92 (requests by the Cambodian government
for technical assistance to achieve its stated goals).
230 See id.
231 U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA, COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE 2002 CAMBODIA, supra note 40, at
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natural resource management, 232 and poverty.233  For instance, the Asian
Development Bank has funded assistance to improve Cambodia's neglected
electric supply system.234 These types of projects will benefit Cambodian
citizens directly and complement WTO-related assistance. Arguably, this
more general aid is tied to Cambodia's WTO accession inasmuch as it is the
result of donor nations' goodwill, and these nations have been major
proponents of Cambodia's WTO bid.235
Notwithstanding any potential negative effects on certain segments of
the Cambodian population, WTO membership will improve overall
Cambodian welfare. Cambodia will benefit from specific WTO agreement
terms as well as its internationally-supported domestic policy initiatives.
V. WTO MEMBERSHIP WILL HELP CAMBODIA TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND JUSTIFIES ACCEPTING THE STRINGENT ACCESSION TERMS
WTO membership does not automatically increase a nation's
prosperity; thirty LDCs are original WTO members and have remained
economicall, disadvantaged.236 Most of the original LDC members of the
WTO have remained poor because their domestic policies have not
23
adequately supported an increase in trade. 2 3 The Cambodian government's
pro-WTO stance recognizes this reality by viewing trade integration as one
of several overall policy goals.238 Cambodia's accession terms may be
rigorous, but they represent not only a cost, but also an investment.
232 See ASIAN DEV. BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR THE
PARTICIPATORY POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF THE TONLE SAP, ABD Doc. CAM 37250 (2003) (detailing a
technical assistance plan for the management of essential lake resources).
233 See Hearing on Foreign Assistance Oversight, supra note 220 (justifying assistance to Cambodia
due to its extreme poverty).
234 ASIAN DEV. BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR THE CAPACITY
BUILDING OF ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY OF CAMBODIA, ABD Doc. CAM 37293 (2003).
25 See EUROPEAN UNION, THE EC-CAMBODIA COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER 2000-2003 54 (2000),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comn/externalrelations/cambodia/csp/02_06_en.pdf (last visited May 1,
2004). The nations giving the most aid to Cambodia are the United States, the European Community,
Japan, France, Australia, Canada, Germany, and Sweden-all WTO members. Id. at 10.
236 See WTO, supra note 3.
237 Seventy-four percent of all LDC exports are generated by only ten LDCs. UNCTAD, supra note
1, at 112.
238 WTO, supra note 7, para 5.
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A. Cambodia's Success Depends on Domestic Policies as Well as WTO
Membership
Despite its recent achievements, Cambodia will continue to confront
political and economic difficulties. Six months following the July 2003
elections, the new government still was not formed because of stalled
political negotiations.239 Cambodia requested an extension from the WTO in
order to ratify its accession protocol later than WTO rules require.
240
Moreover, current domestic political instabilities may threaten future
economic gains. 24 1 As much as donor countries have supported Cambodia's
WTO bid, they have not offered unconditional technical support.242 Thus, as
much as Cambodia's commitment to WTO accession was essential to attract
necessary aid, so too is a continuous commitment to steadfast
implementation of its accession requirements.
Importantly, Cambodian leaders do not harbor false hopes that
membership will be a panacea for the country's problems and they are well
aware of the difficulties that membership obligations will impose on
Cambodia.243  This pragmatic approach acknowledges that WTO
membership is not an end in itself and combines it with domestic policy.
Instead of relying solely on WTO membership, the government has two
other main strategic policies: restoring peace and ensuring sustainable
development.24
B. Cambodia's Burdensome Accession Protocol was a High but
Appropriate Price to Pay
The WTO makes it clear that the membership negotiation process
requires applicant countries to demonstrate what it has to offer the
organization-not to demonstrate why it needs or wants WTO
membership. 245 While the WTO is recognized as an important vehicle for
239 Press Release, WTO, WTO Members Extend Cambodia's Ratification Deadline (Feb. 11, 2004),
available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/news-e/news04_e/gc_cambodia_1 1 feb04 e.htm (last visited May
1,2004).
240 WTO, Accession of Cambodia: Request for Extension of Time-limit for Acceptance of the
Protocol for the Accession of Cambodia, WTO Doc. WT/GC/77 (Jan. 30, 2004).
241 One of the main factors delaying Cambodian development is political instability. EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 235, at 12.
242 WTO members have warned Cambodia that it cannot make implementation contingent on
technical assistance and must ensure implementation regardless. WTO, supra note 7, para. 128.
243 Cambodian Minister Issues Sharp Criticism of WTO after Accession Approval, supra note 143.
244 WTO, supra note 7, para 5.
245 WTO, Membership Alliances & Democracy, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/tif-e/org3_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
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development, 246 it is first and foremost an organization aimed at liberalizing
trade, setting rules to govern that liberalization, and providing a dispute
resolution forum.2 47  It is a voluntary organization consisting of nations
wishing to trade with each other on the most equal and fair basis that they
can negotiate.248
Although meeting its WTO commitments is likely to be challenging
for Cambodia as it enters the implementation phase, it has decided that the
challenges of being a non-member are worse. 4 The government recently
stated that it did not aim for membership at any cost and would not pursue
membership as an end in itself.250  Commerce Minister Chain Prasidh
accurately summarized Cambodia's final accession position: "We managed
to secure a package of commitments and concessions we feel was the most
affordable and possible deal for Cambodia's accession, bearing in mind
Cambodia's little political and economic weight and its current reliance on
external assistance from the major donor countries who are also WTO
members."
251
As substantial as Cambodia's accession commitments are, they result
not from flaws in the WTO but from the realities of international power
politics. Although larger trading partners such as the United States
pressured Cambodia for concessions, these are the nations Cambodia
252depends on as markets for its exports. Fair or not, these major powers set
the trade agenda and refusing to work within the established system simply
removes the opportunity to take advantage of what the system has to offer.
Given its options-retreating from international participation, inefficiently
spending its diplomatic efforts on bilateral negotiations, or joining the
WTO--Cambodia has pursued the best path to build on its progress and
move beyond its past tragedies.
246 See supra Part IVC.
247 WTO, What is the World Trade Organization?, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/factl_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
248 See STIGLITZ, supra note 205, at 16.
249 Jehangir Pocha, Little Cambodia Looks to Trade Up in the World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
2, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0902/pO9sO-woap.html (last visited May 1, 2004).
250 Officials identified WTO accession and integration as one part of a triangle, the other two being
peace and sustainable development. WTO, supra note 14.
251 Press Release, WTO, Ambition Achieved As Ministers Seal Cambodia Membership Deal (Sept.
11, 2003) (Press/354).
252 Cambodia depends on its textile exports to the United States. James Brooke, A Year of Worry for
Cambodia's Garment Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2004, at Cl.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Cambodia's political and economic systems have undergone drastic
changes in the last two decades, transitioning from a foreign-backed
communist regime to a democratically-elected government with an export-
based economic growth policy. Despite some progress, Cambodians remain
among the poorest people in the world, dependent mostly on inefficient
agricultural production for employment. Judicial, economic, and political
reforms remain vital for future growth, and Cambodia is dependent both on
foreign technical and financial assistance.
Due to the demands of WTO accession, the country's leaders have
pursued regional and international economic integration and liberalized
investment laws to foster trade. WTO membership negotiations with
Cambodia have been criticized as excessively demanding for a LDC,
particularly because of the potential negative consequences on poor farmers
and HIV/AIDS victims. Nonetheless, even the most vulnerable Cambodians
would not be helped if Cambodia refused to engage the WTO and remained
on the sidelines of the global trading regime. The country is dependent on
imports for many services and products and has relied on exports to create
jobs for the current generation. By adopting the path of reform and joining
the WTO, Cambodia has invested in its future. Joining the WTO will also
help Cambodia to ensure the continued flow of the international assistance
on which it continues to depend. Cambodia's WTO accession obligations
are certainly far-reaching and demanding, but it is the necessary price that
the small and poor nation must pay to achieve its development goals and
improve the welfare of its people.
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